Boeing's 22-Year Certification Nightmare: Thousands Of Unknown Planes Built With Potentially Dangerous Materials
Washingtoner/10302088

EVERETT, Wash. - Washingtoner -- Recognized quality expert DARYL GUBERMAN, with 40 years of experience in aerospace, medical devices, and safety-critical industries, today released a comprehensive analysis exposing Boeing's 22-year failure to maintain AS9100 certification, conflicts of interest with ANSI–ANAB accreditation, and the systemic risks this has created for global aerospace safety.
Critical Findings

-  Boeing AS9100 Compliance is "NOT CERTIFIED" is Life-Saving: AS9100 is the aerospace industry's gold-standard quality management system. (SEE TABLE-2).

- Boeing's Neglect: Boeing mandated AS9100 certification for all suppliers while remaining uncertified for 22 years.

- Conflict of Interest: Boeing sat on the ANSI–ANAB Management System Accreditation Council MSAC, creating a direct conflict of interest.

- Supplier Portal Call-outs: Boeing referenced ANSI–ANAB on their supplier portal, yet did not certify itself.

- International Accreditation: ANSI–ANAB founded IAF Inc. and ILAC; Boeing's control renders certification legally flawed.

- ISO/IEC 17011 Violation: Clause 4.0 requires impartiality; Boeing's influence over registrars violates this requirement.

Table 1 — Boeing's Conflict of Interest at a Glance

Entity	Role	Conflict & Accreditation Notes
Boeing	Non-AS9100 certified aerospace giant (2002–2024)	Sat on ANSI–ANAB website/webpage: MSAC Management System Accreditation Council-(grant, suspend, withdraw powers) while uncertified; any certification attempted would be legally and technically flawed, even through IAF/ILAC-associated bodies
ANSI–ANAB MSAC	Manages AS9100 certifications	Boeing listed as council member with certification authority; ANSI–ANAB founded IAF Inc. and ILAC, both legally accountable for failures
Boeing Suppliers	April–July 2002	Forced to obtain ANSI–ANAB-accredited AS9100 certification; unequal application of standards

Table 2 — Critical AS9100 Failures Leading to Aircraft Risk

AS9100 Clause	Requirement	Boeing's Failure	Potential Aircraft Risk
7.1.5 Monitoring & Measurement	Calibrate tools for precision manufacturing	Relied solely on supplier paperwork without verification	Fatigue-critical components may fail mid-flight
8.4.2 Control of External Providers	Mandates supplier oversight and audits	Accepted certificates without on-site inspection	Components of unknown origin or improper heat treatment
8.5.1 Control of Production & Service Provision	Enforce welding, heat treatment, and NDT processes	Failed to validate special process compliance (e.g., NADCAP)	Weld or material failure in critical systems
9.2 Internal Audit	Conduct routine internal audits	Audits non-existent or unrecognized by employees	Defects remain undetected
10.2 Nonconformity & Corrective Action	Identify and fix defects systematically	No certified QMS to enforce corrections	Latent flaws may result in catastrophic incidents

Table 3 — Boeing Quality Failures Timeline (2002–2024)

Issue / Time Period	Details	Risk
2002 Supplier More on Washingtoner IRL Investigations Combines Decades of Experience with Modern Digital Expertise New Leadership Model – Never Fire Anyone – Released Today AureaVault Launches U.S.-Licensed Cryptocurrency Exchange with Enhanced Security Features IOTAP Named to 2025 Inc. 5000 List of America's Fastest-Growing Private Companies Spokane: Back to School Traffic Safety NADCAP (April 2002) & AS9100 (July 2002)	Boeing mandated supplier AS9100 certification without holding one itself Also NADCAP special process Heat treat, welding, Non-destructive testing	Risk of uncertified parts entering production
2003 ANSI–ANAB & IAQG OASIS (Online Aerospace System Information System) Database October 2003	Boeing controlled supplier database; suppliers forced to pay fees or face restrictions	Skewed certification and audit enforcement
2009 ODA Adoption	Boeing began self-certifying under FAA's ODA program (96% by 2018)	Reduced external oversight; increased self-certification risk
2020–Present (Ackerman)	Minimized on-site audits as Supplier VP	Increased reliance on paperwork; non-compliance persisted
2022–Present (PRI Board)	Oversight of NADCAP standards while also being part of Boeing	Conflicts of interest; compromised audit integrity
June 2024 Certification	Boeing finally was willing to pursued AS9100 certification after 22 years of neglect	Admission of systemic non-compliance; ongoing safety risk

Table 4 — Doug Ackerman's 20+ Year Record on the 777 Program

Period & Role	Key Failures Under His Leadership	Violated AS9100 Clauses	Impact
2002–2022 (777 Program Lead)	No AS9100 certification; reliance on supplier paperwork; skipped critical on-site audits	7.1.5, 8.4.2, 8.5.1, 9.2, 10.2	Unverified parts entered aircraft; structural risks
2022–2024 (Supplier Quality VP)	Continued "send your certificate, send your parts" culture; ignored 22 years of neglect	8.4.2, 9.2, 10.2	Allowed non-compliant suppliers; safety culture eroded

Table 5 — Flawed Registrars and ISO/IEC 17011 Conformity assessment — Requirements for accreditation bodies accrediting conformity assessment bodies Impartiality Violations

Registrar Company	Role		Impropriety / Violation	Impact on Certification
TÜV Rhineland	ANSI–ANAB-accredited registrar	Reason Why: SECTION-7	Controlled/overseen by Boeing-influenced accreditation body; violates ISO/IEC 17011 Clause 4.0 impartiality requirements	Certificates are legally and technically flawed; cannot guarantee supplier or system compliance
TÜV SÜD	ANSI–ANAB-accredited registrar	Reason Why: SECTION-7	Same as above	Certificates cannot be relied upon for aerospace or safety-critical systems
Intertek	ANSI–ANAB-accredited registrar	Reason Why: SECTION-7	Same as above	Creates systemic risk; may result in undetected defects entering production
DQS	ANSI–ANAB-accredited registrar	Reason Why: SECTION-7	Same as above	Invalidates confidence in the integrity of AS9100 certifications
NQA	ANSI–ANAB-accredited registrar	Reason Why: More on Washingtoner Lineus Medical and Venture Medical Sign New Zealand Distribution Agreement Black Plumbing Expands to Cleburne, TX, Bringing Over 30 Years of Trusted Plumbing Service MD Electric Group Secures Major Government and Commercial Contracts $5 - $20 Million in Sales for 2026; $25 - $40 Million for 2027 Projected with NASA Agreements; New MOU Signed to Improve Solar Tech in Space New Book: Cold War Sci-Fi Thriller Arrives Today SECTION-7	Same as above	Certification claims are compromised; suppliers appear compliant on paper only
NSF	ANSI–ANAB-accredited registrar	Reason Why: SECTION-7	Same as above	Flawed certifications undermine both national and international safety frameworks
BSI	ANSI–ANAB-accredited registrar	Reason Why: SECTION-7	Same as above	Certificates issued under influence of Boeing's control are inherently unreliable

Recognized QA Expert and Boeing Shareholder DARYL GUBERMAN attended the DHS Subcommittee Whistleblower Meeting April 17,2024 concerning Boeing's deeply concerning quality practices https://www.newstribune.com/photos/2024/

The flaw is systemic, not personal. Certificates are flawed due to Boeing's control over accreditation, not auditors. ISO/IEC 17011 Clause 4.0 mandates independence and impartiality. Boeing's influence invalidates the integrity of these certifications, posing life-threatening systemic risk.

Between 2002 and 2024, Boeing manufactured between 8,000 and 12,000 aircraft under a defective and conflicted certification regime known as "send your certificate, send your parts." Suppliers were instructed to submit paperwork instead of undergoing mandatory on-site audits—only to be visited "if need be" or "if need arises."

This shocking revelation, uncovered and exposed by DARYL GUBERMAN, recognized quality expert and Boeing shareholder, reveals a disaster waiting to happen. Yet, mainstream media refuses to report this because it would expose systemic collusion between Boeing, ANSI–ANAB, and their international accreditation counterparts (IAF/ILAC).

Expert Findings by DARYL GUBERMAN

In October 2024, Recognized QA Expert and Boeing Shareholder DARYL GUBERMAN conducted an independent investigation across Boeing facilities in Washington State: Everett, Auburn, Renton, and Northfield. Employees were unaware of AS9100 standards and internal audit procedures, exposing a culture of compliance neglect. Elizabeth Lund, then VP of Quality, admitted in June 2024 that Boeing was only then "willing to obtain AS9100 certification"(after 22 years of Boeings neglect)—a tacit acknowledgment of decades of evasion.

Reason Why:

A)     Nineteen days after 911 Boeing came out with a notification to lay off 20,000 to 30,000 employees.

1) April 2002 Supplier Bulletin Performance Review Institute NADCAP National Aerospace and Defense Contractors Accreditation Program certification (HEAT TREATMENT, WELDING, Non-destructive testing- CRITICAL FLIGHT SAFETY INSPECTION) Suppliers were instructed to send in their certificates and parts, with on-site audits only if need arises

2) July 2002 Supplier Bulletin: AS9100 Certification must be ANSI–ANAB Accredited Suppliers were instructed to send in their certificates and parts, with on-site audits only if the need be.

Boeing's Confession on On-Site Supplier Audits

Boeing's procedures explicitly state: "Our preference is to deal with proven suppliers with excellent quality performance and not have to do on-site quality system surveys" (survey is no more than an audit). This is a confession that Boeing rarely stepped into supplier facilities unless necessary. For 22 years, Boeing relied on AS9100 or similar NADCAP certifications, accepting certificates and parts without on-site verification.

ATTENTION READER WHAT DOES: If Need Arises Or If Need Be means?

3) Boeing called ANSI–ANAB out on Supplier Portal or international equivalent (China, Iran, Pakistan equivalent to ANSI-ANAB ACCREDITATION)

4) ANSI–ANAB Website: Management System Accreditation Council (MSAC) (grant, suspend, or withdraw certification) Boeing sat as member on the MSAC webpage { How could Boeing grant, suspend and withdraw certification when they were not certified themselves?!

5) Boeing pursuing AS9100 certification in 2024 now from ANSI–ANAB—the very body it mandated for suppliers July 2002 and sits on the Management System Accreditation Council (MSAC)—is a direct conflict of interest Leveraging international accreditation is under ILAC or IAF to validate decades of self-declared compliance. International Accreditation Forum incorporated in Delaware (ANSI -ANAB founded the IAF) IAF sister organization in Australia are associations of national and international accreditation bodies equivalent in accreditation to ANSI-ANAB who are also underwriters for IAF/ILAC meaning they are subjected legally to systematic and product failure responsibility for IAF and ILAC members.

6)  Federal Complicity: Federal agencies—DOJ, DHS, Commerce, and FDA—sit on ANSI–ANAB's board while claiming to oversee Boeing, creating a rigged system of collusion that allows fraudulent certification practices and a wholesale cover-up of America's aviation safety failures.

7) Seven registrars—TUV Rhineland, TUV-SUD, Intertek, DQS, NQA, NSF, and BSI—sit on the ANSI–ANAB board, the very body that accredits them. BSI registrars further sit on the Management System Accreditation Committee, alongside Boeing, with the authority to grant, suspend, or withdraw certifications.

Key Conflicts of Interest:

1.         Self-Policing: Registrars oversee the accreditation body that certifies them.

2.         BSI's Dual Power: BSI can enforce certifications on companies while shaping accreditation standards with those same companies.

3.         Board Bias Risk: All seven registrars influence rules that can advantage their own businesses and disadvantage competitors.

4.         ISO/IEC 17011 – Impartiality Requirement: ISO/IEC 17011 sets requirements for accreditation bodies accrediting conformity assessment bodies (i.e., the accreditation body accrediting registration/certification bodies). The dual roles of these registrars directly compromise impartiality, violating the standard's core principle and undermining trust in the certification process.

REFERENCE ARTICLE SUPPLEMENTS:

"Boeing's 22-Year-264 months & 8,036 days: Certification Monopoly: 8,300–12,500 Aircraft Flying Without True Independent Inspection" https://www.prlog.org/13092750-boeings-22-year-264-months-8036-days-certification-monopoly-830012500-aircraft-flying-without-true-independent-inspection.html