Boeing's Two-Decade Quality Collapse: 8,000–12,000 Aircraft Manufactured Under Fraudulent Certification Oversight
Washingtoner/10301929

EVERETT, Wash. & WASHINGTON - Washingtoner -- DARYL GUBERMAN, recognized quality expert and Boeing shareholder, exposes a 22-year systemic failure that left thousands of aircraft flying with unchecked safety risks while media stays silent. Recognized QA Expert and Boeing Shareholder DARYL GUBERMAN  attended the DHS Subcommittee Whistleblower Meeting April 17,2024 concerning Boeing's deeply concerning quality practices https://www.newstribune.com/photos/2024/

Between 2002 and 2024, Boeing manufactured between 8,000 and 12,000 aircraft under a defective and conflicted certification regime known as "send your certificate, send your parts." Suppliers were instructed to submit paperwork instead of undergoing mandatory on-site audits—only to be visited "if need be" or "if need arises."

This shocking revelation, uncovered and exposed by DARYL GUBERMAN, recognized quality expert and Boeing shareholder, reveals a disaster waiting to happen. Yet, mainstream media refuses to report this because it would expose systemic collusion between Boeing, ANSI–ANAB, and their international accreditation counterparts (IAF/ILAC).

Table 1 — Boeing's Conflict of Interest at a Glance

Entity Role Conflict Boeing Non-AS9100 certified aerospace giant (2002–2024) Sat on ANSI–ANAB MSAC with certification powers ANSI–ANAB MSAC Manages AS9100 certifications Listed Boeing as a council member that could grant, suspend, and withdraw certifications Boeing Suppliers April 2002 July 2002 NADCAP special processes heat treatment, welding, Non-destructive testing Forced to obtain AS9100 via ANSI–ANAB accreditation Unequal application of standards

Table 2 — Critical AS9100 Failures Leading to Aircraft Risk AIRCRAFT CRASH

AS9100 Clause Requirement Boeing's Failure Potential Aircraft Risk 7.1.5 Monitoring & Measurement Calibrate tools for precision manufacturing Relied solely on supplier paperwork without verification Fatigue-critical components may fail mid-flight 8.4.2 Control of External Providers Mandates supplier oversight and audits Accepted certificates without on-site inspection Components of unknown origin or improper heat treatment 8.5.1 Control of Production & Service Provision Enforce welding, heat treatment, and NDT processes Failed to validate special process compliance (e.g., NADCAP) Weld or material failure in critical systems 9.2 Internal Audit Conduct routine internal audits Audits non-existent or unrecognized by employees Defects remain undetected 10.2 Nonconformity & Corrective Action Identify and fix defects systematically No certified QMS to enforce corrections Latent flaws may result in catastrophic incidents

Table 3 — Boeing Quality Failures Timeline (2002–2024)

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Issue / Time Period Details Risk 2002 Supplier NADCAP & AS9100 Boeing demanded supplier certification without holding one itself Risk of uncertified parts entering production 2009 (ODA Adoption) Boeing began self-certifying under FAA's ODA program (96% by 2018) Reduced external oversight 2020–Present (Ackerman) Ackerman minimized on-site audits as Supplier VP Increased reliance on paperwork 2022–Present (PRI Board) Ackerman joined PRI overseeing NADCAP standards Conflicts of interest June 2024 Certification Boeing only then pursued AS9100 certification after 22 years of neglect Tacit admission of systemic non-compliance

Table 4 — Doug Ackerman's 20+ Year Record of Failure on the 777 Program

Period & Role Key Failures Under His Leadership Violated AS9100 Clauses Impact 2002–2022 (777 Program Lead) No AS9100 certification; reliance on supplier paperwork; skipped critical on-site audits. 7.1.5, 8.4.2, 8.5.1, 9.2, 10.2 Unverified parts entered aircraft; structural risks 2022–2024 (Supplier Quality VP) Continued "send your certificate, send your parts" culture; ignored 22 years of neglect despite whistleblower warnings. 8.4.2, 9.2, 10.2 Allowed noncompliant suppliers; safety culture eroded

"Boeing's culture of 'send your certificate, send your parts' without meaningful audits represents a catastrophic gamble with passenger lives. Between 2002 and 2024, as many as 8,000-12,000 aircraft may carry risks embedded in their very structure because Boeing refused to enforce the same standard it demanded of suppliers."
— DARYL GUBERMAN, recognized quality expert and Boeing shareholder

Expert Findings by DARYL GUBERMAN

In October 2024, recognized QA Expert and Boeing Shareholder DARYL GUBERMAN conducted an independent investigation across Boeing facilities in Washington State: Everett, Auburn, Renton, and Northfield. Employees were unaware of AS9100 standards and internal audit procedures, exposing a culture of compliance neglect. Elizabeth Lund, then VP of Quality, admitted in June 2024 that Boeing was only then "willing to obtain AS9100 certification"(after 22 years of Boeings neglect)—a tacit acknowledgment of decades of evasion.

Reason Why:

A)     Nineteen days after 911 Boeing came out with a notification to lay off 20,000 to 30,000 employees.

1) April 2002 Supplier Bulletin Performance Review Institute NADCAP National Aerospace and Defense Contractors Accreditation Program certification (HEAT TREATMENT, WELDING, Non-destructive testing- CRITICAL FLIGHT SAFETY INSPECTION) Suppliers were instructed to send in their certificates and parts, with on-site audits only if need arises

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2) July 2002 Supplier Bulletin: AS9100 Certification must be ANSI–ANAB Accredited Suppliers were instructed to send in their certificates and parts, with on-site audits only if the need be.

Boeing's Confession on On-Site Supplier Audits

Boeing's procedures explicitly state: "Our preference is to deal with proven suppliers with excellent quality performance and not have to do on-site quality system surveys" (survey is no more than an audit). This is a confession that Boeing rarely stepped into supplier facilities unless necessary. For 22 years, Boeing relied on AS9100 or similar NADCAP certifications, accepting certificates and parts without on-site verification.

ATTENTION READER WHAT DOES: If Need Arises Or If Need Be means?

3) Boeing called ANSI–ANAB out on Supplier Portal or international equivalent (China, Iran, Pakistan equivalent to ANSI-ANAB ACCREDITATION)

4) ANSI–ANAB Website: Management System Accreditation Council (MSAC) (grant, suspend, or withdraw certification) Boeing sat as member on the MSAC webpage { How could Boeing grant, suspend and withdraw certification when they were not certified themselves?!

5) Boeing pursuing AS9100 certification in 2024 now from ANSI–ANAB—the very body it mandated for suppliers July 2002 and sits on the Management System Accreditation Council (MSAC)—is a direct conflict of interest and a fraud. Leveraging international accreditation's under ILAC or IAF to validate decades of self-declared compliance is fraudulent. International Accreditation Forum incorporated in Delaware (ANSI -ANAB founded the IAF) IAF sister organization in Australia are associations of national and international accreditation bodies equivalent in accreditation to ANSI-ANAB who are also underwriters for IAF/ILAC meaning they are subjected legally to systematic and product failure responsibility for IAF and ILAC members.

Conclusion

Doug Ackerman's 35 years at Boeing, including his critical 2020–2024 Supplier Quality tenure, reveal systemic quality failures. His silence on the AS9100 gap, coupled with his position on the PRI/NADCAP board, underscores an era where certification was treated as paperwork rather than protection—placing passenger safety, supplier credibility, and aviation trust at significant risk.

Doug Ackerman's 20+ year leadership over the 777 program and supplier quality operations has left a lasting mark of negligence. Boeing's delayed move to obtain AS9100 certification in June 2024—22 years late—confirms this was not oversight; it was policy.

Mainstream media will not expose this because of corporate entanglements, advertising revenue, and political shielding. The question remains: how long will passengers keep flying on paperwork instead of proven safety?

REFERENCE ARTICLE SUPPLEMENTS:

WHAT MEDIA DOESN'T WANT YOU TO KNOW

"Boeing's 22-Year-264 months & 8,036 days: Certification Monopoly: 8,300–12,500 Aircraft Flying Without True Independent Inspection" https://www.prlog.org/13092750-boeings-22-year-264-months-8036-days-certification-monopoly-830012500-aircraft-flying-without-true-independent-inspection.html

40-Year Quality Recognized Expert Daryl Guberman Exposes Boeing's Two-Decade AS9100 Fraud, Putting 8,000–12,000 Aircraft at Risk https://www.prlog.org/13095008-40-year-quality-recognized-expert-daryl-guberman-exposes-boeings-two-decade-as9100-fraud-putting-800012000-aircraft-at-risk.html

Boeing's 22-Year Certification Gap & Doug Ackerman's Boeing VP Of Quality 35-Year Silence: A Quality Oversight Crisis Exposed https://www.prlog.org/13095098-boeings-22-year-certification-gap-doug-ackermans-boeing-vp-of-quality-35-year-silence-quality-oversight-crisis-exposed.html

Boeing's 22-Year Quality Mirage: AS9100 Non-Certification, Supplier Fraud, and Global Passenger Risk (8,000-12,000 -Planes 2002-PRESENT) https://www.prlog.org/13095075-boeings-22-year-quality-mirage-as9100-non-certification-supplier-fraud-and-global-passenger-risk-8000-12000-planes-2002-present.html#

Boarding Your Next Flight? You Might Be Playing Boeing's Deadliest Lottery https://www.prlog.org/13092956-boarding-your-next-flight-you-might-be-playing-boeings-deadliest-lottery.html

$9 Billion in Damages: Boeing and ANSI–ANAB Must Reimburse 20,000 AS9100 Suppliers for 22 Years of Illegal Compliance Demands, Says QA Expert https://www.prlog.org/13090149-9-billion-in-damages-boeing-and-ansianab-must-reimburse-20000-as9100-suppliers-for-22-years-of-illegal-compliance-demands-says-qa-expert.html