ATTENTION: DGCA India & CAAC China — Boeing Quality Chief Doug Ackerman Linked To 24 Year Unaccredited Manufacturing Gap Ahead Of 787 Failures
Washingtoner/10326694

EVERETT, Wash. - Washingtoner -- FEATURE ARTICLE:

Daryl Guberman, CEO of Guberman PMC LLC, Boeing shareholder, and a 40‑year aerospace quality‑systems expert, has issued a formal forensic warning to the Directorate General Of Civil Aviation (DGCA) of India and the Civil Aviation Administration Of China (CAAC).

The Guberman Analysis  https://guberman-quality.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/THE-GUBERMAN-ANALYSIS-1.pdf

The Guberman Analysis establishes that the June 12, 2025 Air India 787 crash was the inevitable result of a 24‑year collapse in Boeing's certification, accreditation, and oversight structure, not a component or pilot failure. It demonstrates how Boeing's abandonment of AS9100, the FAA's 2009 ODA expansion, and ANAB's global contamination of the MRA‑MLA chain created a non‑certified, structurally compromised manufacturing system that invalidated airworthiness from Day One. The analysis concludes that the aircraft was built, tested, and approved inside a system so degraded that failure was not an anomaly — it was the logical outcome.

This notice follows the June 4, 2026 Lufthansa 787 nose‑gear collapse, an event Guberman identifies as a predictable and preventable outcome of Boeing's long‑standing refusal to operate within a certified AS9100 environment. https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/lufthansa-crew-members-several-injured-787-nose-gear-collapse-frankfurt

Guberman states that the Lufthansa failure is not an isolated mechanical defect, but the direct result of a 24‑year breakdown in Boeing's manufacturing oversight, enabled by structural conflicts of interest and the collapse of independent accreditation.

Critical Forensic Evidence: The Ackerman Conflict Of Interest

Regulators are directed to the official Performance Review Institute (PRI) governance portal:

Official PRI Board Of Directors Profile:

https://www.p-r-i.org/about-us/board-of-directors/doug-ackerman

This link verifies that Doug Ackerman, Boeing's Senior Vice President Of Quality, holds an active seat on the PRI Board Of Directors — the same body responsible for NADCAP - National Aerospace and Defense Contractors Accreditation (April 2002 Boeing Supplier Bulletin for heat treatment and welding and other critical processes NADCAP certification) oversight of Boeing's special‑process suppliers. Boeing's 22-Year Certification Gap & Doug Ackerman's Boeing VP Of Quality 35-Year Silence: A Quality Oversight Crisis Exposed https://www.prlog.org/13095098-boeings-22-year-certification-gap-doug-ackermans-boeing-vp-of-quality-35-year-silence-quality-oversight-crisis-exposed.html

This dual role represents a direct violation of ISO/IEC 17011 impartiality requirements, creating a closed‑loop oversight structure where Boeing influences:

• Internal quality decisions, and
• External supplier accreditation

…simultaneously.

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This conflict is not theoretical — it is operational, structural, and ongoing.

Gubeman: possess the actual physical copies of these documents in his forensic archive: the April 2002 bulletin concerning NADCAP and the July 2002 bulletin concerning AS9100 accredited by ANAB.

This is actual words from Boeing Supplier Bulletins of July 2002

3) An on-site Boeing survey (which is an audit) of suppliers quality system if need be:

Our preference is to deal with proven suppliers with excellent quality performance and not have to do on-site quality system surveys

The Fraud: These documents prove exactly when and how Boeing systematically bypassed independent third-party accreditation. They established a 24-year uncertified build environment by substituting rubber-stamped "CERTs" for rigorous, independent oversight.

It is also directly relevant to the Lufthansa 787 collapse, because the special‑process failures that contribute to landing‑gear defects fall under the lack of AS9100 system integration that Boeing has not had for 24 years, which Ackerman oversees while also serving as Boeing's top quality executive.

The 24‑Year Certification Gap & Ackerman's 35‑Year Silence

Guberman's forensic archive contains scrubbed Boeing supplier bulletins from 2002, removed from Boeing's online portal but preserved in physical form. These documents reveal:

• Boeing instructed suppliers to ship parts with only a CERT (certificate)
• Boeing stated it preferred not to conduct on‑site quality‑system audits
• NADCAP and AS9100 oversight was effectively bypassed

This created a 24‑year uncertified build environment, affecting:

• Heat treatment
• Welding
• NDT
• Chemical processing
• Composites
• Calibration
• Landing‑gear components
• And other critical aerospace processes

Ackerman's 35‑year tenure at Boeing overlaps the entire period of non‑certified production — and he never disclosed, corrected, or publicly acknowledged the gap.

The Lufthansa 787 collapse is the first major public failure directly traceable to this uncertified environment.

The ICOP System: How Boeing, Lockheed, And Airbus Control Oversight

The Industry Controlled Other Party (ICOP) scheme — created under the International Aerospace Quality Group (IAQG) — governs AS9100 certification worldwide.

ICOP controls:

• Which registrars are approved
• Which auditors are authorized
• Who enters the OASIS database
• How oversight is conducted
• Which organizations are allowed to certify others

Because ICOP is controlled by Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Airbus, the manufacturers themselves influence the oversight system meant to regulate them.

This structure allowed Boeing to operate for 24 years without AS9100 certification, while still shaping the system that certifies its suppliers.

ICOP mentioned in this article along with FAA Falsification Standards  https://www.prlog.org/13149097-attention-dgca-caac-beyond-bogusguberman-reveals-global-accreditation-fraud-boeing-toggle-switch-testing-in-seattle-will-be-charade.html

Why Boeing Never Implemented AS9100

AS9100 requires:

• Internal audits
• Management reviews
• Supplier verification
• Calibration traceability
• Documented corrective actions
• Process controls
• Personnel being removed from production lines to perform audits

This last requirement is the core issue.

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Boeing refused to take personnel off aircraft and out of offices to perform internal audits.

Internal audits interrupt production.

Boeing refused to interrupt production — for 24 years.

The Lufthansa collapse is the inevitable result of this refusal.

The Reuters Contradiction (June 2024) https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-brief-european-regulators-new-production-plans-after-737-max-panel-2024-06-27/  ( last paragraph in article)

In June 2024, Elizabeth Lund, former Boeing Vice President Of Quality, told Reuters:

• Boeing was "willing and prepared" to get AS9100
• Boeing was "compliant to the standard"
• Boeing was "conducting internal audits as if certified"

Guberman investigation proved these statements categorically false.

In October 2024, Daryl Guberman conducted a field investigation across Everett, Renton, Auburn, and Northfield.

He discovered:

• Employees had no knowledge of AS9100
• No internal audits had ever been performed
• No AS9100 training had been conducted
• No one knew whether Boeing was certified
• Supervisors blocked attendance at safety meetings
• Employees said ("Daryl, when I'm asked to go to a safety meeting, my boss says no — the plane has to move to the next station.")

This investigation connected the dots from July 2002 to October 2024, revealing a 24‑year audit void.

This became the documented forensic record known as:

Guberman's Discovery

It proves Boeing never intended to implement AS9100 because doing so would require:

• Halting production
• Pulling workers off aircraft
• Conducting internal audits
• Documenting nonconformities
• Verifying corrective actions
• Ensuring supplier compliance

Boeing refused to interrupt production — even when safety required it.

The Lufthansa collapse is the first visible manifestation of this systemic failure.

The Guberman Discovery (October 2024) shows that Boeing systematically bypassed AS9100 certification beginning in July 2002, avoiding audits and corrective actions that would have slowed production. It directly contradicts Elizabeth Lund's June 27, 2024 Reuters claim that Boeing was "prepared to get AS9100," already "compliant," and conducting "internal audits," findings disproven by October 2024 field investigations showing employees had never heard of the standard and were routinely blocked from safety meetings because "the airplane has to move to the next station." By shifting compliance burdens onto suppliers while still referencing the defunct ANAB (ANSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board on its website, Boeing maintained a façade of oversight that prioritized production flow over the aerospace‑mandated safety and quality cycle. (changed in 2014 to ANSI-ANAB)  https://guberman-quality.com/wp content/uploads/2026/05/GUBERMAN-DISCOVERY-2026.pdf

DGCA & CAAC: Regulatory Exposure

Guberman warns that:

• India's 787 toggle‑switch investigation is not an isolated defect, but a symptom of systemic accreditation bypass,
• China's 200‑aircraft Boeing order is being overseen by the same leadership that allowed uncertified aircraft to leave the factory for decades.

Both regulators are now exposed to liability transfer from Boeing's uncertified environment.

Legal Voidance Under MRA/MLA

Documents from VP or ANAB and former Chair of the International Accreditation Forum (IAF), confirm that:

• ILAC MRA-Multi-Regional Agreement and IAF MLA-Multi-Lateral Agreement require a certified environment for test results to be legally recognized
• Boeing's uncertified environment renders all testing invalid
• Regulators accepting these results assume full liability for future failures

This places DGCA, CAAC, and all global regulators in a high‑risk legal position.

The Warning

Guberman states:

"If I didn't give a damn, I wouldn't write you so many times. I'm writing because I don't want a disaster to happen — and it is going to happen."

"Those who forge strength from fraud, will one day be crushed by the weight of their own deception."
— Daryl Guberman, 2026